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When satisfaction is not enough*
Comments on Schlenker’s ‘Be articulate.
A pragmatic theory of presupposition projection’
ROB VAN DER SANDT
1. Prelude
Philippe Schlenker has written a provocative and intriguing paper, ﬁrmly
taking sides with E-type proponents in their attack on dynamic semantics.
After stating that an E-type approach to donkey-anaphora is essentially
correct, he boldly claims that the fortune of dynamic semantics now
largely rests on the second motivation for dynamic semantics, the analysis
of presupposition. After a general criticism pertaining to the ‘explanatory
adequacy’ of Heim’s account he returns to a line of theorizing that
was prevalent in the seventies. The name of this revival is Transparency
Theory, an account which aims to capture the Karttunen/Heim predic-
tions (and is for this reason taken to be ‘descriptively adequate’), does so
in a static fashion and is thus argued to supersede the current dynamic
accounts (both the Heim and the DRT-based versions) in being ‘explana-
tory adequate’.
2. The unsatisﬁed analyst
Schlenker’s theory correctly mimics Karttunen’s (1974) and Heim’s (1983)
account (the satisfaction theory for short) in predicting that (1a) through
(1c) presuppose that France has a king.
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(1) a. The king of France is bald.
b. The king of France is not bald.
c. If the king of France is bald, he wears a wig.
He also correctly predicts that none of (2a) through (2d) presupposes that
France has a king.
(2) a. France has a king and the king of France is bald.
b. It is not true that France has a king and the king of France is
bald.
c. If France has a king, the king of France is bald.1
Furthermore, he manages to do so without making any stipulations with
respect to the heritage properties of the logical connectives.
The major virtue of the satisfaction theory is its elegance and simplic-
ity. However, as is well known from the literature, it is beset by a host of
empirical problems. In unmodiﬁed form its predictions are too strong.2
(3) a. It is not the case that the king of France is bald: France is a
republic.
b. Either the king of France or the president of France opened the
exhibition.
c. It is possible that France has no king but it is also possible that
the king of France is in exile.
d. If I realize later that I have not told the truth, I will confess it to
everyone.
1 The predictions are actually slightly stronger. If the antecedent of a conditional entails a
presupposition of the consequent clause (or the ﬁrst conjunct of a conjunction a presup-
position of the second) the presupposition of the full sentence trivializes to a tautology.
Heim (1983) explicitly defends this and takes the fact that Gazdar predicts preservation
of the presupposition as a decisive counterexample. I disagree. Consider
(i) If John has grandchildren, his children will be happy.
(ii) They always wanted to have o¤spring.
The ﬁrst sentence has a presupposing reading. Note that the pronoun in (ii) picks up the
referent for the children that makes after processing the ﬁrst sentence is accommodated
in the main context. I add that (i) also has a non-presupposing reading. A theory of pre-
supposition should thus allow both interpretation possibilities.
2 The reader may consult Gazdar’s discussion (1979) for a thorough overview.
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The basic rules wrongly predict substantial presuppositions for each of
(3a) through (3d).
In other cases the predictions are too weak.
(4) a. If baldness is hereditary, the king of France is bald.
b. If baldness is hereditary and the king of France is bald, he wears
a wig.
c. Either baldness is not hereditary or the king of France wears a
wig.
d. It is possible that baldness is hereditary and that the king of
France is bald.
The prediction is that none of (4a) through (4c) presupposes that France
has a king but instead that they have the conditionalized (5) as their
presupposition.3
(5) If baldness is hereditary, there is a king of France.
When we consider multiple embeddings the situation tends to get worse at
each further embedding. Thus (6a) is predicted to presuppose (6b).
(6) a. If baldness is not hereditary, then Pﬁzer will develop a cure and
the king of France will sell his wig.
b. If baldness is not hereditary, then if Pﬁzer will develop a cure,
there is a king of France.
The problem is quite general, has become known as the proviso problem
and is extensively discussed in Geurts (1999).
Satisfaction theorists have answers to both problems. With respect to
the examples under (3) they invoke a mechanism of local (or more general
non-global) accommodation. Since their theory relies on (a succession of )
intermediate contexts this is a viable option.4 For Schlenker’s theory
which does not allow for such things as intermediate contexts, it is not.
3 Note that we may continue each of (4a) through (4d) with e.g. ‘He is a proud man’. The
possibility of pronominal uptake is hard to explain unless the incoming context contains
a referent for the king of France. Cf. footnote 1.
4 I should remark that the way Heim implements this, forces us to tinker with the update
rules which in fact comes down to postulating a semantic ambiguity in the connectives.
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Schlenker claims however that the e¤ects can be ‘emulated’ within the
transparancy framework:
[ . . . ] under duress (e.g. to avoid a very bad conversational outcome, such as the
utterance of a contradiction or a triviality), one may assume that the speaker did
not obey Be articulate.
In his bivalent system this has the e¤ect of leaving us with the ‘unadorned
bivalent meaning’ i.e. no presupposition whatsoever. I don’t see how this
can count as an emulation within Transparency Theory. It strikes me
more as the theory-external claim that in the face of threatening counter-
examples the theory does not apply.5
As to the second problem I remark that for a satisfaction theorist con-
ditional weakening is in a sense natural. Heim for example takes presup-
positions to be the (minimal) conditions for the update to be deﬁned. But,
so Beaver (2001) adds, the presupposition computed need not be the ma-
terial that is to be accommodated. In order to account for the intuitive
inferences which arise from the material that is accommodated in the
main context we may invoke a pragmatic strengthening mechanism to
obtain the stronger predictions.6 Such a strategy may be open to a pro-
ponent of a semantic account of presupposition. It is not a reasonable
option for Schlenker’s pragmatic emulation. For, how should this work?
Should we ﬁrst derive the weak predictions by means of pragmatic princi-
ples and subsequently invoke pragmatics again to strengthen the predic-
tions that have just been obtained by their very means? This would im-
mediately raise a question as to the rationale of ﬁrst deriving the weak
predictions. But Schlenker has an alternative:
[ . . . ] we apply Transparency to a simple clause without taking into account the
syntactic environment in which [it] occurs. [ . . . ] instead of computing the mini-
mum accommodation to guarantee that q is (incrementally) transparent, you de-
cide, somewhat lazily, to just consider qq 0 on his own, and to compute Transpar-
ency with respect to this constituent alone. (p. 30)
5 But see footnote 8.
6 The formulation may suggest that I subscribe to such a strategy. Nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth. Limitations of space prevent me to go into this issue here, however.
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That is, we ignore the linguistic context and apply the theory to the trig-
gering conﬁguration as if it occurred in isolation. This correctly predicts
that all of (4a) through (4d) presuppose that France has a king.7 But it
would also predict that (2c) and each of (3a) though (3d) presuppose
that there is a king of France. This holds generally. On this strategy com-
plex sentences always inherit the presuppositions of their parts. Staight-
forward application would bring us back to Langendoen & Savin’s (1971)
cumulative hypothesis which since the observations by Karttunen and
others in the early 70s has not been defended by anyone.
This leaves Transparancy Theory with two escape routes, each equally
powerful.8 Firstly, if triviality or contradiction threatens, the theory does
not apply and no presupposition is predicted. If on the other hand intu-
ition asks for a more substantial presupposition, laziness takes over; we
simply ignore the surrounding context and thus predict that the triggered
material makes it unmodiﬁed to the main context. Depending on the phe-
nomena we thus may choose between total cancellation or total preserva-
tion. For a theory that presents itself primarily as superseding others in
‘explanatory adequacy’ this is somewhat disappointing.
3. Explanory adequacy
Schlenker critizes Heim’s account for lack of ‘explanatory adequacy’.
Now Heim showed that given her deﬁnitions of the context change poten-
tial of the logical connectives Karttunen (1974) type inheritance condi-
tions fall out as a side e¤ect of the contextual update. This is right. Sure,
Heim slightly overstated her point. As Soames pointed out, we may give
alternative dynamic deﬁnitions for the connectives which agree with the
incremental version on their static truth conditions but show di¤erent
7 Schlenker’s discussion suggests that ‘accommodating’ the stronger presupposition is
licensed because it is ‘distinguished as a ‘pre-condition’ of the meaning’ and therefore
salient. I don’t see how this is supposed to work. Is the proposition that there is a king
of France more salient in (4a) then in (2c)? The reverse seems to be the case.
8 One could imagine an optimality-theoretic elaboration which would tell us what princi-
ple applies when. Though this would make the theory predictive it would also raise the
question what is the point of deriving the Karttunen/Heim predictions in the ﬁrst place.
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inheritance conditions. An example isb which has the following deﬁned-
ness conditions:
(7) C½jb c is deﬁned if C½c is deﬁned and C½c½j is deﬁned.
When evaluating this ‘conjunction’ we process from right to left, ﬁrst
checking whether the presuppositions of the second conjunct are satisﬁed
and then whether the presupposition of the ﬁrst conjunct updated with
the second one are satisﬁed. However, the fact that it is possible to deﬁne
such a connective can hardly count as an argument against a dynamic
deﬁnition of the logical connectives. For, thoughb is formally a possible
connective, it certainly is not a reasonable one. The simple fact that time
doesn’t ﬂow backwards, utterances are processed in time and human cog-
nition developed in a universe where this so happens, deﬁnitely discour-
aged this faculty to process information this way. This excludes b,
though not for logical reasons.9
Since I don’t want to get involved in a general philosophical discussion
on the notion of explanatory adequacy of theories, I just state two reason-
able prerequisites for a theory of presupposition. We would like to see an
explication of the notion of presupposition which explains why presuppo-
sitions have a function in discourse that distinguishes them from mere en-
tailments in a classical logic; and, secondly, an explication of the projec-
tion behaviour of the presuppositions. And the latter should be regulated
by general principles of a logical or pragmatic nature. Unfortunately
Schlenker’s account is not very enlightening on either of these issues. On
Schlenker’s picture a presupposition is a part of bivalent meaning, ‘one
that strives to be articulated as a separate conjunct’ (p. 3–4). This begs
the question. For what semantic or pragmatic feature urges a part of bi-
valent meaning to struggle for articulation? Worse, this characterisation is
– as we will see in a moment – circular in view of the fact that ‘Be articu-
late’ depends on the notion of presupposition. As to the second question,
9 The discussion reminds me of the infamous connective tonk. Is a system of natural de-
duction arbitrary, given that it is possible to deﬁne a connective that has the introduc-
tion rule of a disjunction and the elimination rule of the conjunction? Of course not. It
only shows that we need reasonable constraints on the deﬁnition of connectives. And
these are not internal to the system but given at a metalevel and motivated in terms of
the role they play in the full theory.
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the basic intuition is the Stalnakerian one: presuppositional information
is – in a sense to be explained – information that is taken for granted
and ideally already part of the incoming context at the moment the sen-
tence is uttered. The problem then is to explain why the information in-
duced (the presuppositional part in Schlenker’s terminology) has – in con-
tradistinction to the non-presupposition remainder – the properties that
account for this special behaviour.
Schlenker gives an answer to this question as well. His theory is ‘ex-
planatorily adequate’ in the sense that the prediction of projection is fully
regulated by pragmatic principles of a Gricean nature. But how Gricean
are they? As stated ‘Be articulate’ does not constrain the projection of
presuppositions but directly depends on the notion of presupposition (the
information triggered). This is worrying since for Schlenker the presuppo-
sitional parts of a sentence meaning are simply bivalent meaning compo-
nents that struggle for articulation. Moreover, the principle invites the
speaker to explicitly state (‘articulate’) the presuppositional component,
something which – in Schlenker’s bivalent account – seems quite superﬂu-
ous in view of the fact that this information is already entailed by the in-
ducing sentence. For why should a speaker articulate (1a) as (2a) when
‘Be articulate’ is controlled by ‘Be brief ’ and the speaker could convey
the same information by the shorter but truthconditionally equivalent
non-articulated version (note that ‘Be articulate’ is defeasible and ‘Be
brief ’ is never violated).
I have problems with Schlenker’s version of ‘Be brief ’ as well. It is
clearly not a matter of length (which would exclude (2a) and render only
its pronominal variant (8) felicitous).
(8) France has a king and he is bald.
And then, the di¤erence in length is often not spectacular or simply non-
existent. In the following pair the articulated and non-articulated variant
are of equal length.
(9) a. John knows that he is ill.
b. John is ill and knows it.
What Schlenker calls ‘briefness’ turns out to be a limited version of what
is (non)informativity or semantic redundancy on other accounts. It thus
should not be derived from Grice’s Manner as Schlenker suggests but
from Quantity 1 and 2.
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4. An historical excursus
Let me draw attention to a simple (but admittedly old fashioned) bivalent
alternative that was developed in the early 80s.10 This account agrees with
the intuition of Stalnaker and other theorists that presuppositional ex-
pressions contain information that is ideally part of the incoming context.
In the absence of further information a cooperative speaker will thus try
to interpret such a sentence over contexts that already contain the infor-
mation invoked. In the default case this will give us the presupposition as
a contextual entailment; the presupposition will thus pass unharmed (we
would nowadays call it ‘accommodation’). Thus
(10) Either baldness is not hereditary or John’s children are bald.
is predicted to presuppose that John has children. The reason is that (10)
can be felicitously interpreted in a context which contains this informa-
tion as the acceptability of (11) shows:
(11) John has children. And either baldness is not hereditary or his chil-
dren are bald:
This theory does not try to articulate the induced information as sepa-
rate conjunct to check whether this conjunct is superﬂuous and the non-
articulated version preferable. Instead it tries to ‘articulate’ this informa-
tion straightforwardly in the main context, thus mimicking the behaviour
of a cooperative hearer. If the interpreter succeeds, the sentence is pre-
dicted to be presupposing. But clearly, not any sentence is interpretable in
any context. It may be that a sentence is not felicitous in a context which
already contains the presuppositional information. This happens if the in-
terpretation of the inducing sentence in a context which already contains
the presuppositional information violates Gricean requirements of infor-
mativity (let us call this – incremental – e‰ciency). For example, (12)
(12) Either John does not have any children or all his children are in
hiding.
is not acceptable in a context which contains the information that John
has children, as (13) shows:
10 Van der Sandt (1982/1988), not to be confused with his later anaphoric account.
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(13) John has children. . . . Either he has no children or his children are
all in hiding.
The reason is that in the given context (12) is equivalent to its second
disjunct:
(14) John’s children are in hiding.
which is certainly a shorter, less redundant and a more e‰cient way to
convey the information that John’s children are in hiding (note that this
is a more general version of Schlenker’s ‘Be brief ’). The original sentence
thus cannot be interpreted in any context which contains the presuppo-
sitional material of the second disjunct and this information will con-
sequently be interpreted locally. Put otherwise, the full sentence is not
presupposing for the simple reason that the information cannot be ac-
commodated. This is captured in the following simple deﬁnition:
(15) A sentence j presupposes a sentence c in a context c just in case
(i) one of the component sentences of j induces the presupposi-
tional information that c; and
(ii) j is acceptable in cþ c.11
It turns out that constraints of global and local informativity and consis-
tency su‰ce as constraints on acceptability.12
The account just sketched has several vices which it shares with
Schlenker’s and all other pragmatic accounts. As in Gazdar (1979) it re-
mains unclear what happens to presuppositions in case they don’t survive
(and why then should this information be invoked to begin with), it is un-
able to formally capture the notion of accommodation,13 and it runs into
binding problems in intensional contexts.
11 The original deﬁnition contained an extra (and awkward) clause intended to account for
sentences with conﬂicting presuppositions. This clause turns to be superﬂuous since con-
tradictory presuppositions are already handled by clause (ii). This was pointed out long
ago by Henk Zeevat (p.c.).
12 See for details Van der Sandt (1982/88) and Beaver (2001).
13 The problem is that accommodation is an operation on input contexts. Global accom-
modation expands an input context c into a richer context c 0 which contains the material
that is required to process the relevant sentence. On a static account we have no choice
but to compute the presupposition and then increment it in the subsequent context. This
plays havoc with the deﬁning characteristic of presuppositions. For formally they so end
up on a par with assertoric material.
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The account is also superior to Schlenker’s in various ways. It gives
a simple and intuitive notion of presupposition, projection behaviour is
regulated by independent Gricean principles (it is thus presumably ‘ex-
planatorily adequate’ in Schlenker’s sense), it captures all of Gazdar’s
predictions and improves on his account by an incremental account of
conjunctions. And – last but not least – it does not run into the proviso
problem.
5. Postlude
Transparency Theory achieves its primary goal. It derives the Karttunen/
Heim predictions without having to specify the heritage properties for the
logical connectives. But it does so at the cost of the simplicity and ele-
gance we perceive in its original incarnation. Schlenker gives his account
in a static two-valued semantics. However if we want to develop a pre-
supposition theory in a purely pragmatic way it is unwise to ﬁrst derive
the Karttunen/Heim predictions and then to invoke two powerful mech-
anisms that make the core of the theory superﬂuous. In its present state
Transparancy Theory is better not called a theory. For to count as a
theory it should at least have predictive power. We might take it to be
an intellectual exercise to establish some equivalence results. But that’s
not the way it is advertised. It is advertised as an exercise in anti-
dynamics. I consider the prospects of such an enterprise moot. So here is
my ﬁnal advice: dynamize. And as DRT-versions have shown, this does
not necessarily involve a dynamic deﬁnition of the conjunction.
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